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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
W. B. RUSSELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
8603

THEOGDENUNIONRAILWAY AND
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is a suit brought by the plaintiff for breach of
an employment contract, praying for damages at the time
of trial in the sum of $40,000.00. This is the second appeal,
the opinion of this court being found in 247 P. (2d) at page
257, decided August 6, 1952, but not yet printed in the Utah
Reports. We do not agree with appellant's statement of the
facts, for a number of reasons other than that the state-,
ment is incorrect and incomplete.
Note: To complete the record we found it necessary to obtain an order of the
lower court pursuant to Rule 75 (h) for the transmission to this court of a supplemental record, containing the verdict of the jury showing their special findings and
a second supplemental record containing the second amended complaint and defendant's
answer thereto, which pleadings formed the basis for the pre-trial order and defined
the issues litigated in the court below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
rrhe plaintiff was employed by defendant through the
war years, frorn August of 1941 to August 3, 1945. I-Iis
employment was governed, in part, by a carrier union collective bargaining agreement covering the wages, hours and
working conditions of "yardmen" employed by defendant
in its yard at Ogden. The parties thereto, the signatories,
were respondent herein and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, bargaining agent for the employees :

So far as material the contract provided:
"55(b). LEAVE OF ABSENCE: Yardmen
taking leave of absence for a period of over ten days
must secure and fill out Form 153 so the leave will
he covered as a rna tter of record."
"ARTICLE VIII.-INVESTIGATIONS
"38. Investigations: No yardman will be suspended or dismissed without first having a fair and
impartial hearing and his guilt established. The
man whose case is under consideration may be represented by an employe of his choice, who may be
a committeeman, who will be permitted to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his representative
shall be permitted to hear the testimony of witnesses.
Charges will be investigated within 5 days and the
result of the infestigation will be made known within
3 days. In fixing hours at which investigation shall
be held, due consideration of the need of rest by
yardmen will be given by the company's officials. A
yardman shall be entitled to an investigation before
his record is assessed with demerits. In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman shall be reinstated and paid for all tin1e lost, provided objection
has been filed with Superintendent in writing not
later than thirty days from date of dismissal; other-
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wise pay for time lost will commence ten days after
date of letter of objection" (Pl. Ex. E).
July 4, 1945, plaintiff Russell burned his leg with some
steam while on the job. He did not work the following five
days but was released to return to work by Dr. Keith L.
Stratford, company doctor, July 11, 1945. He didn't report
for work until July 19. He then worked only two daysthe 19th and 20th of July, 1945 (Tr. 123-124). Dr. Stratford, after Russell had been discharged and was seeking
reinstatement advised the company that Russell was, in his
opinion, able to work after July 11, 1945 (Def. Ex. 6). Dr.
Stratford knew when he wrote that letter, that the company was inquiring a.s to whether or not Russell was unable
to work after July 20, 1945 (Def. Ex. 5). Dr. Stratford also
testified at the trial that Russell was able to work after
July 11, 1945 even though Russell had called at his office
July 27 and was given some drops for his ear. After working July 19 and 20 only, Russell left the job. After the
lapse of more than ten days during which nothing was heard
from him, Russell was. notified to appear before Assistant
Superintendent Caulk, now dead, for an investigation on
account of being absent in excess of ten days without written leave in violation of Rule 55 (b) of the contract. He
requested and received a continuance and the investigation
was held August 3, 1945. The hearing was. stenographically
reported and transcribed and is in evidence (Pl. Ex. A).
The plaintiff Russell was present in person and represented
by the local chairman of his union, J. B. Hudgens. No complaint was made then nor throughout the long course of his
litigation that the plaintiff was not given proper notice of
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the hearing, or allowed to testify in his own behalf or
produce any witnesses he chose or was denied the right to
a representative of his own choice. The hearing was
continued to a day of his own choosing, he was present with
a representative of his own choosing. We mention this here
because the only issue plaintiff has made in this case has
been that the plaintiff was not guilty of violating Rule
55 (b) relating to absence, under such circumstances as
justified his dismissal. Now, and for the first time Mr.
Patterson, counsel for Russell, endeavors to claim in his
brief that Russell was deprived of the foregoing procedural
rights.
The transcript of the hearing (Pl. Ex. A) reveals: 1.
That plaintiff knew that written leave was required for an
absence in excess of ten days. 2. That he did not secure
written leave. 3. That he never at any time communicated
with the company, requested any leave or advised them
in any way of any reason for his absence. His excuse for
his absence which he gave for the first time at the hearing
was that he was "sick in bed."
He was interrogated as follows by Assistant Superintendent Caulk:
"Q.

I understand you own a club up the can-

"A.

I don't.

"Q.

You work up there don't you?
Yes."

yon.

"A.

Since discipline, was assessed Russell had a right to a
copy of the transcript and was supposed to sign it. After
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the testimony was transcribed, he called at the office of the
Assistant Superintendent and secured the transcript changing the answer "Yes" and having it read "No" before
he signed.
Russell received notice from Mr. Caulk on August 4,
1945, that he was discharged for being absent without written leave for a period of ten days (Tr. 61). He had six
months thereafter within which to appeal. Five and onehalf months thereafter, on January 14 he did appeal through
the local chairman of his union to Mr. R. E. Edens, Superintendent of the respondent company. Mr. R. E. Edens, also
now dead, declined to reinstate him and so advised his local
chairman by letter of January 22, 1946 (Pl. Ex. C).
The next and. final step required of Russell in handling
his grievance with the company was to appeal his dismissal
to the highest supervising officer of the company who was
Mr. F. C. Paulsen, operating Vice President of the defendant company and General Manager of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company (Tr. 152). This final appeal he took,
being represented by Mr. C. E. McDaniels, acting Vice
President of the Switchmen's Union of North America.
He authorized McDaniels in writing as an officer of the
SUN A, to prosecute and progress his grievance claim, to
act as his agent and representative in his place and stead
and authorized McDaniels to "negotiate, adjust and dispose
of" the grievance "in any manner" (Def. Ex. I). McDaniels proceeded to handle Russell's claim and after some correspondence a conference was arranged in the office of
Mr. Paulsen in Salt Lake City between Mr. Paulsen and
Mr. McDaniels. This conference took place May 7, 1946,
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Mr. McDaniels and Mr. Pausen being the only ones present
(Tr. 159). There was but the one conference (Tr. 159).
1\tlr. Paulsen and Mr. McDaniels reviewed the investigation
(Tr. 160) and Mr Paulsen told McDaniels that Russell had
falsified at the investigation (Tr. 161). Mr. McDaniels
told Paulsen that if Russell falsified at the investigation
"we don't condone it" (Tr. 161). McDaniels asked for an
opportunity to investigate the charge Mr. Paulsen had made,
stating that if the accusation was correct he would advise
Paulsen thereof, but that he wanted "to be sure that I'm
right" and "I'll not go along with a man that will not tell
the truth" (Tr. 160-161-162). The conference closed on this
note. No further conferences were held and Mr. Paulsen
heard no more from either McDaniels, or Russell or anyone
else on Russell's behalf, (Tr. 162) except through a letter
dated May '14, 1946, written by Mr. McDaniels and addressed to Mr. Paulsen (Def. Ex. 13). McDaniels in this
letter referred to the conference held May 7, and specifically to the charge n1ade that Russell had falsified, advised
Paulsen that he had completed his investigation and "we
are withdrawing the grievance and the case is closed." Mr.
Paulsen upon receipt of McDaniel's letter of ~lay 14 closed
his files on the case, and thereafter treated the matter as
a Hdead issue" and heard no more of the matter until
Russell filed this suit for unlawful discharge in May of
1949, three years later (Tr. 165).
The issues of fact, and there \vere no questions of law,
tried out in the court below were set out in the pretrial
order (R. 12). We invite the court's attention thereto. In
view of the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant the
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matter of damages is, of course, out of the case. The pretrial order recites that the "issues of law and fact as fixed
by the court" so far as the plaintiff's case is concerned are
"1. Did the plaintiff fail to perform his contract of employment in that he violated Rule 55 (b) of the contract of
employment." So far as the defendant was concerned the
pre-trial order stated defendant's position as follows:
"1. That the plaintiff's discharge was in compliance
with and in conformity with the applicable provisions of
the contract.
"2. That the defendant was justified in dismissing
the plaintiff from his employment for violation of Rule
55 (b).
"3. That plaintiff's action is barred for the reason
that the claimed grievance of the plaintiff was settled and
disposed of by mutual agreement between the plaintiff and
the defendant and in accordance with the provisions of the
contract and the National Railway Labor Act."
It should be clear that counsel on both sides and the
court were adhering strictly to the holding of this court
in its former decision. Simply stated the·re were but two
things litigated: viz., 1. Was the defendant justified in
dismissing the plaintiff? 2. Did the parties settle and dispose of the controversy by mutual agreement?
In the former opinion 247 P. (2d) 257, Mr. Justice
1\icDonough said at page 260 :
"However, upon proof of the contract of employment such as that herein involved, the employee
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established a prima facie case by proving such contract, his performance thereof up to the tirae of
discharge, and damages (citing authority). The
burden of proving justification for the discharge
then falls upon the defendant."
We were entitled as Mr. Justice McDonough said at
page 261 to "present any legal or equitable defense available to overcome such prima facie case." In other words
it was for the jury to decide whether or not cause for discharge existed.
The· court submitted the following special interrogatories to the jury :
"1. Did the Depot Company in fact breach the contract by not complying with Article VIII, Rule 38 as
claimed?" Answer : "No."
"2. Was Mr. Russell in fact guilty of violating Article XIII Rule 55 (b) by being absent from work from about
July 20 to July 31, 1945 ?" Answer: "Yes." (See Supp.
Record.)
In addition the jury returned a general verdict, which
was unanimous (Tr. 261) in favor of defendant and against
plaintiff of "no cause of Action."

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b) DOES CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE.
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POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT DID ACCORD THE PLAINTIFF· HIS RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38.

POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT NEVER OFFERED ANY
EVIDENCE TO PROVE OR CLAIMED IN
"ORAL ARGUMENT" Tf.Ii\.T PLAINTIFF vVAS
DISCIIARGED FOR ANY REASON OTHER
THAN VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b).

POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS OR IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY P·LAINTIFF.

POINT V.
THIS CASE WAS SETTLED AND DISPOSED
OF B.Y MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
VIOLATION OF R-ULE 55(b) DOES CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR DISCHARGE.
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We admitted in our first brief, have always admitted
and admit now that if it was impossible for an employee
to comply with the rule. discharge would not be justified.
In the former opinion Mr. Justice McDonough said at p.
262:
''* * * it is practically conceded in the brief
of the defendant that if the plaintiff was in fact
unable, because of illness, to comply with Article
VIII, Rule 55 (b), the defendant would not have assessed the discipline that it did."
Moreover we agree entirely with Mr. Justice Crockett in
his separate concurring opinion that the company must not
act "arbitrarily or in bad faith" in connection with any
phase of the hearing or in the assessment of discipline. We
agree with Justice Crockett at page 263 where he rejects
any idea that after notice and hearing by the company "it
is entirely up to their representative to make the determination regardless of how abritrary it is." May we say
we never intended to give any such impression.
Plaintiff lifts out of context and quotes in his brief a
portion of the testimony of the witness, H. C. Beckett, an
e·mployee, who was local chairman of the bargaining agent
union from 1923 to 1953-a period of thirty years, and who
signed the contract that is here involved on behalf of the
employees-in an effort to show the parties did not consider
violation of Rule 55 (b) a ground for discharge. His testimony as a whole (Tr. 124-139) clearly shows the contrary.
..c'\.fter calling the 'vitness Beckett's attention to the fact
that no penalty was provided in the rule itself Mr. Patter-
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son further interrogated the witness on cross examination
as follows:
Mr. Patterson: "Q. In other words, it was
mandatory to drop him from the service?"
Mr. Beckett: "A. There is plenty. There is a
record down there, I guess hundreds of them who
were dropped from the rolls because they were absent without proper leaves.
"Q. Mr. Edens testified yesterday sometimes
they dropped them and sometimes they didn't. Would
you say Mr. Edens is wrong?
"A. I would say the records down there, hundreds of men were dropped from the rolls during
my period of time.
"Q.

"A.

Mr. Beckett, can't you answer yes, or no?
y es, sir.
.

Well, I asked you one. Would you say Mr.
Edens was wrong when he said sometimes they
didn't and sometimes they did?
"A. Well, I don't know what Mr. Edens had in
his mind. I couldn't explain that.
"Q.

All right. And you don't know whether
Mr. Edens was right or wrong.
"A. I can't tell you what Mr. Edens had in
mind when he made that statement, but I know that
Mr. Edens and myself closed out many records because of the fact the man didn't protect himself by
a leave of absence.
"Q.

When he was sick in bed?
"A. Well, if he was sick in bed we usually
provided for that.
"Q.
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"Q. \Vhat do you mean you usually provided
for that,
"A. Well, if we found that a man was sick
in bed or was injured and so forth, that he was
more or less granted a leave· of absence when it was
a bona fide fact that such was the case" (Tr. 131132). (Italics ours.)

Beckett was uncontradicted, and it thus appears that
violation of Rule 55 (b) was customarily regarded by the
parties as a grounds of discharge, it further appearing
that it was not administered arbitrarily or in bad faith
(Tr. 132-133).
In the case of Ward vs. American Linen Supply, ( ...
Ut.... ) 307 P. (2d) 210, decided by this court as recently as
February 8, 1957, Mr. Justice Wade refers to the conunon
law rule that gave the employer the right to discharge for
any cause without incurring liability. We realize this case
dealt with a rather narrow issue and that under the contract
now before the court no employee can be discharged for any
cause without first receiving a fair and impartial hearing.
But the "causes" for discharge are not set out. 'Ve can
discharge for any cause.
But the real reason that this Point I should be summarily resolved against the plaintiff is that here-in plaintiff's brief, for the first time in this seemingly endless litigation, the point is raised. At no time in the pleadings,
stipulations or pre-trial order, or in any other place or manner was this point ever placed in issue, nor was it litigated
at the trial. The lower court never passed on the question,
which if it had been present, would have been a question
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of law. We do not see how this court can notice a point such
as this, raised for the first time in a brief on appeal.

POINT II.
THE DEFENDANT DID ACCORD THE PLAINTIFF HIS RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38.
What were his rights. under Rule 38? He was entitled
among other things to a fair and impartial hearing on the
charge made against him. The jury in answer to the special
interrogatory "Did the Depot Company in fact break the
contract by not complying with Article VIII, Rule 38" answered "No." Apparently what plaintiff's counsel intends
to say here is that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
the jury in finding that the plaintiff was accorded his rights
under Rule 38. But he points to nothing whatever, as evidence that the investigation was not conducted openly and
fairly, or suggests that it was conducted arbitrarily and in
bad faith. To be sure, the transcript does not reflect the
skill, learning and artistry to be expected of a hearing
conducted by lawyers or men engaged in presiding at administrative hearings. Mr. Caulk was a railroader-no
more adept in this medium than Russell or his representative Hudgens, local chairman of the Union, or than railroaders generally are in this situation. These investigations
always leave much to be desired from the critical standpoint of a lawyer. But Russell had notice, he asked and
was granted a continuance, he was present in person, given
a chance to explain his absence, he was represented by Mr.
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Hudgens, the local chairman, he had a right to call any
witnesses he desired. He produced no witnesses in his
behalf, yet Russell knew when he went to that hearing on
August 3, 1945, that his job was in the balance. Plaintiff's
counsel calls our attention to nothing in the evidence indicating he was not given all these procedural rights.
Whatever the evidence or lack thereof may have been
at the investigation when Russell elected to sue in the courts
for a breach of contract, it became the duty of the court
(the jury in this instance) to decide on the basis of the evidence produced at the trial the same as in any other suit
for breach of contract, whether there had been a breach.
Russell vs. OUR&D, supra. And all evidence as Justice
McDonough said, that was competent and relevant, whether
legal or equitable was admissible on the question of whether
or not the contract had been breached by defendant. If the
former opinion makes anything clear, it is that the jury
were the ones to decide whether Russell was guilty of the
charge that led to his dismissal. It is well worth quoting.
At page 261, it is said:
"At this point, we refer briefly to a contention
of the plaintiff. He contends that since Rule 38,
Art. 8 of the collective bargaining agreement provides that 'no yardman will be suspended or dismissed without first having a fair and impartial
hearing and his guilt established,' the correct construction of such rule requires that the evidence
taken before the investigating officer must clearly
reveal the yardman's guilt. For several reasons we
think that this contention is without merit."
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After a discussion of some other facets of the problem, Mr.
Justice McDonough concluded this portion of the opinion
by saying:
"We here reiterate that he is here seeking redress in the courts for an unjust discharge. The
court as the trier of the fact must determine whether
or not his guilt was in fact established." (Italics
added.)
And that was the process followed in the trial below, the
question being submitted to the jury on all the evidence in
the case.
If this Point II of plaintiff means that the evidence at
the trial was insufficient to support a finding that Russell
was guilty of a violation of Rule 38 under such circumstances as warranted his dismissal (and we cannot imagine
what else counsel could mean by it), it would seem that
plaintiff would discuss. the evidence in an effort to show
its insufficiency. Except for a brief discussion of the evidence of Dr. Keith Stratford, the company physician, plaintiff's attorney does not point out wherein the evidence was
"wholly insufficient" to support the verdict.
Instead, he appears to contend that some "Federal
Rule" is involved. He advises us that cases in State Courts
under the Federal Employers Liability Act are governed
by the federal concept of negligence and federal decisions.
That of course is well known. He cites Urie vs. Thompson,
337 U. S. 163; 93 L. Ed. 1282, wherein the Supreme Court
held that an employee in interstate commerce by rail might
recover damages for occupational disease, in this instance
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"silicosis," which it was contended resulted from the use
of sanders on locomotives.

Jester vs. Southern Ry. Co., 29 SE (2d) 768, is an
FELA case where an engineer shot and killed his fireman
for not obeying orders. Plaintiff says the same requirement
to follow Federal decisions in FELA cases is also mandatory
in contract cases; citing Transcontinental and Western Air,
Inc., vs. Koppal, 345 U. S. 653; 97 L. Ed. 1325. Koppal
holds the very opposite, to wit: that in suits for breach of
a union carrier agreement in a State Court substantive
and procedural laws of the State govern. Koppal brought
suit in the Federal Court in Missouri, an action under
Missouri law, for wrongful discharge. As the court knows,
collective agreements of air lines, are governed by the Railway Labor Act. Missouri State Law requires the exhaustion of the administrative remedies in all contracts as a
condition precedent to maintaining action in court. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that Koppal could
not maintain his action in the Federal District Court of
Missouri until he had shown that he had brought himself
within the re·quirements of the Missouri State Law even
though the contract involved was entered into pursuant to
the Railway Labor Act. It is thus clear that the Supreme
Court of the United States has said actions for breach of a
contract of employment, contracts entered into under the
Railway Labor Act, shall proceed according to State La,vs,
substantive and procedural, the exact opposite of plaintiff's
contention. We say again this case is nothing but a simple
"garden variety" type of action for breach of contract under
Utah law. The former decision of this court so held, and
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the Supreme Court of the United States so holds in the
Koppal case.
The only piece of evidence plaintiff refers to is the
testimony of Dr. Stratford and two letters which he wrote
in connection with this case. We think that a brief reference by us to all of the evidence including that of Dr. Stratford is called for under this point. If the Court will be
kind enough to indulge us briefly, we think such a review
of the evidence will also dispose of the next point in plaintiff's brief (Point III) with very little additional comment.
The plaintiff in his brief says that all that can be, a.ccorded Dr. Stratford's testimony and his letter of April
30, 1946 is that Russell was able to work on July 11, 1945,
and that we torture the evidence by claiming the evidence
of Dr. Stratford related as well, to the period Russell was
absent without leave. However, while Russell was. seeking
reinstatement and on April 27, 1946, Superintendent R. E.
Edens wrote to Dr. Stratford (Def. Ex. 5) and in that
letter, among other things, said: "Mr. Russell was. dismissed
for being absent without proper leave of absence and he is
endeavoring to secure reinstatement with pay for time lost
on the basis that his absence was due to illness." * * *
"Shall appreciate it if you will check your records further
and advise whether or not you consider the earache was of
such nature as to cause him to be incapacitated from work
from July 27 to August 6." The doctor was thus advised
that Russell had been dismissed for being absent without
proper leave, was claiming that his absence was due to illness and that he was being asked specifically as to whether
the earache was of such a nature as to cause Russell to be
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incapacitated from work. On April 30, 1946, three days
after the foregoing letter was written, Dr. Stratford wrote
Mr. Edens as follows: "In checking our files on William
B. Russell, former switchman, I found all the dates correct.
Mr. Russe11 complained of very much pain during the visits
(visits for the burn on his leg as well as the earache-see
Edens' letter Def. Ex. 5) to our office. I believe he was
capable of working after his release on July 11, 1945 (Def.
Ey. 6). lVloreover, Dr. Stratford testified as follows at the
trial.
Questions by Mr. Bronson calling his attention to Exhibit 6.
"Q. You say here, 'I believe he was capable of
working after his release on July 11, 1945,' is that
correct?
"A. That's correct.
"Q. And was that your opinion at the time
when you wrote it?
"A. That was my opinion at that time.
"Q.

"A.

Will you testify it is your opinion now?
Yes, sir."

There is no question but that Russell called on Dr.
Stratford on July 27 complaining of an earache and received
some drops therefor. The plaintiff makes much of the fact
that Dr. Stratford, a company physician, gave him a release
for work on August 6. Russell obtained the release from
Dr. Stratford by trick (there is no other word for it) in
order to bolster his claim that he was sick and under the
care of a doctor during the period of time which was the
subject of the investigation. Russell testified that he re-
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ceived notice of his discharge August 4 (Tr. 61). He also
admitted that thereafter (after he was discharged) and
on August 6 he went to Dr. Stratford's office, requested and
received, a release to return to work (Tr. 61). He also testified that he did not tell Dr. Stratford when he got therelease that he had been discharged (Tr. 64). He also admitted that he never turned this release into the company,
which ordinarily v1ould be the only purpose for obtaining
it, (Tr. 64) but that he retained it and gav~e it to his counsel,
Mr. Patterson (Tr. 63). Dr. Stratford testified that he did
not know at the time he gave Russell the release to return
to work that he had been discharged (Tr. 147).
Both Russell and his wife, Margaret, were subpoenaed
by the defendant to appear as witnesses at the trial. Russell
testified that the Pine View Inn was leased in December
1944 "by his wife." Russell took out a beer license from
Weber County for the Pine View Inn, the application being
d'ated May 10, 1945 and signed "Mrs. Margaret Russell by
W. B. Russell" (Def. Ex. 2). This signature was in the
plaintiff's handwriting (Tr. 73), and the application recited as follows : "The names, ages and addresses of all
persons directly or indirectly connected with said business
for which license is hereby applied for are Mrs Margaret
Russell, legal age, and W. B. Russell, legal age." He testified this license cost $200.00 and that the lease rental on
the Pine View Inn was $150.00 to $175.00 per month (Tr.
74). That it was also necessary to stock the establishment
with supplies, that both bottled and draught beer was. sold
and the dining room specialized in steaks, chicken and trout
dinners (Tr. 80). They also sold various sundry items. All
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of the r.aoney to start this business Russell said he loaned
to his wife, Margaret (Tr. 76). Mrs. Margaret Russell also
testified that Russell loaned her the money to get the business started (Tr. 91). Russell testified that as between
him and his wife he took no note, made no memorandum,
or record of the transaction that it was, as he said, "all in
the family" (Tr. 76). Apparently the Pine View Inn was
a fairly substantial "set-up." According to testimony of
Mrs. Margaret Russell, they served bottled and draught
beer at a bar where twenty or thirty men could stand at
one time (Tr. 95), they had seven or eight tables in the
dining room where they served principally trout, steak and
chicken dinners (Tr. 95). The Ogden area was swarming
with military personnel in the summer of 1945 (Tr. 79-80).
They \Vere able to sell all the beer, steaks, etc. that could
be obtained ( Tr. 80) , there being a shortage of such items.
Mrs. Russell testified that in July and August they were
"as busy as they could be," that she didn't know how much
they took in each month as Mr. Russell kept the books, but
that it was at least $1,000.00 a month "maybe more" (Tr.
95). That July 24, Pioneer Day, (which was during the
period of Russell's absence from work), was a big business
day. Mr. Russell testified that beer was hard to get at
that time and one had to have contacts to get it (Tr. 79).
Apparently, Russell had these contacts having worked as a
bar tender for Combe, who owned the Marion Bar in Ogden,
and from whom the Pine View Inn was leased. After his
discharge, he was employed most of the time by beer distributing companies.
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Mrs. Russell prior to the venture with the Pine View
Inn had no business experience whatsoever according to
her own testimony (Tr. 93). She testified that she had
never before worked for anybody (Tr. 93) and that she
had had no previous experience running a restaurant or
bar (Tr. 93). It appears from the evidence that the Pine
View Inn was usually opened sometime in the afternoon and
kept open until 12, 1, or 2 o'clock in the morning. Russell,
was working the 11 P.M. to 7 A.M. shift, which permitted
him after he had obtained his rest to have· at least five or
six hours· which could have been devoted to this business
and of course Russell seldom worked for the defendant
company, putting in only sixty two days in the first seven
months of 1945. There were thus five months out of the
first seven in 1945 that he could have devoted to the business.
The Russells lived in a house or cabin behind the Pine
View Inn. Russell, himself, admitted that he sometimes
cooked, that he sometimes tended bar and did other work
about the Pine View Inn "to help his wife" (Tr. 78). Mrs.
Russell had four little children, ages one to nine, to take
care of in the summer of 1945, in addition to all her other
duties of operating the Pine View Inn. Is it any wonder
that the jury did not believe that Russell, seldom working
at his job on the railroad, experienced in the beer business
and having contacts that enabled him to get beer, would do
nothing; while his wife, Margaret, who had never worked
for anyone, who had no previous business experience whatsoever and had the care of four little children, operated this
fairly substantial restaurant and bar business by herself?
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Moreover, in addition to Russell admitting at the trial under
oath that he did work to some extent around the Pine View
Inn, Mrs. Russell testified :
Questions by Mr. Bronson :
And you had four little children at that
time, ages one to nine to take care of, didn't you?
"A. Yes.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

And you ran this business yourself?
Yes.
Your husband, did he help you?
Yes.
And he was working up there?
He helped me as a husband" (Tr. 96).

During the examination of Mr. Russell we referred to
the transcript of the official investigation and asked him
if the true answer to the question by Mr. Caulk, to wit,
"You '\Vork up there don't you?" was not in fact "yes,"
which was the answer he had changed to "no" and he answered * * * "Mr. Bronson, if you don't receive wages
for anything there's no work" (Tr. 85).
We submit that the foregoing testhnony out of the
mouths of the plaintiff Russell and his wife was amply
sufficient together with the other evidence to \Yarrant the
jury in returning the verdict they did. A jury does not
have to believe any witness--even though he is uncontradicted if his testimony is inherently improbable either in
an absolute sense, or in the light of other evidence in the
case.
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POINT III.
THE DEFENDANT NEVER OFFERED ANY
EVIDENCE TO PROVE OR CLAIMED IN
"ORAL ARGUMENT" THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
DISCHARGED FOR ANY REASON OTHER
THAN VIOLATION OF RULE 55(b).
The plaintiff says the evidence we produced shows
plaintiff was discharged "at least in part" for reasons other
than violation of Rule 55 (b). If the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding plaintiff violated Rule
55 (b) under circumstances warranting dismissal, that is
enough; and if it shows something additional that certainly
gives the plaintiff no grounds for complaint. We have never
claimed and do not claim now that we have a right to justify
Russell's discharge for any cause other than violation of
Rule 55 (b). The evidence we detailed under Point II was
competent and relevant as tending to show justification for
the discharge and its probative value was for the jury. We
see no need for further discussion of this point.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS OR IN ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff's attorney claims that the court's instructions
do not comport with a "federal rule." The federal rule he
refers to is the rule followed in cases tried under the Federal Employers Liability Act as indicated earlier in this
brief. Again, we say there is no "federal rule" whatever
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in¥olved. Counsel says that the instructions are diametrically opposed to the case of Transcontinental & Western
Air, Inc., vs. Koppal, supra. As pointed out above, this case
holds that state rules of procedure apply to suits for
breaches of contracts entered into pursuant to the Railway
Labor Act, the same as to any other suit in a state court for
breach of contract. We are not going to repeat ourselves
and refer to this matter again, although plaintiff's counsel
belabors it throughout his discussion under Point IV.
The plaintiff's exceptions to instruction given: The
plaintiff excepted to paragraph 2 of Instruction No. 2 but
gave no reasons. This the court might overlook but the
plaintiff does not point out any error in the brief with
respect thereto. We should not be required to defend an
instruction of which the plaintiff has not offered a single
word of criticism.
The plaintiff excepted to the court's instruction Number 2, paragraph 3 (a). The court there instructed the jury:
"However, if you find the above has been proved
by a preponderance of the evidence you will award
Mr. Russell damages in accordance with instructions
that follow, unless you also find that the Railroad
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence
* * * that
"(a) Mr. Russell was in fact guilty of violation of Rule 55(b) by being absent from July 20 to
July 31 without proper leave under circumstances
justifying his dismissal."
This is unquestionably correct law and the court might
well have stopped at this point. The court added parenthetically :
"(In other words an employee cannot recover
for being dismissed on a charge which is true, re-
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gardless of whether or not he was accorded. a proper
investigation because the law presumes that had he
been accorded a proper investigation he would have
been dismissed any way. Under such a circumstance,
the sufficiency of the investigation is immaterial.) "
We will concede that it is doubtful that the court added
anything to his instruction by the parenthetical explanation.
We do not concede it was in error. Preceding the parenthetical explanation the court made a clear, concise and
accurate statement of the law when he said the railroad
had the burden of proof to show that Mr. Russell was in
fact guilty of violation of Rule 55 (b), by being absent from
July 20 to July 31, without proper leave, under circumstances justifying his dismissal. Moreover counsel in making his objection did not advise the trial court of "the
grounds of his objection" in this instance as required by
Rule 51 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We are not unaware that the court in its discretion may disregard his
failure to do so. Plaintiff contends that we conceded the
error in this instruction. We suggested to the court that
he elaborate, explain the matter further to the jury, so
that it would not appear to be too favorable to the defendant. The court stated "I believe it is covered in a later
instruction." We concluded the matter was covered adequately and accurately and did not refer to it again. There
was a constant effort throughout this trial on the part of
the plaintiff to implant in the minds of the jury, in the
teeth of the former opinion of this court, that the transcript
of the official investigation did not reveal the plaintiff's
guilt and plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover. The
court sought to make plain to the jury in the questioned
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instruction that regardless of the evidence at the investigation, the jury was to decide the validity of the discharge
upon all the evidence produced before them at the trial.
The plaintiff complains of Instruction No. 3 because
it tells the jury the railroad was required to comply with
the provisions of Rule 38 requiring notice of the hearing,
notice of the charge, according the plaintiff the right to
appear in person, to be represented by someone of his own
choice, etc. "unless these requirements were waived by the
plaintiff." This is a correct statement and while there was
no specific evidence that the plaintiff had waived these
provisions, he did in fact waive part of them by not producing any witnesses and not taking the witness stand in his
own behalf. There was no harm in the court making this
explanation to the jury.
Plaintiff complains that in instruction Number 3 the
court erred further, in ''gratuitously'' injecting the que~tion
of mistake into the case. Assuming it was not necessary
to the determination of the two principal issues in the case,
and that the trial court was acting "gratuitously" we submit it was harmless in view of the issues, the other instructions and the fndings of the jury on the special interrogatories. In no single particular does the plaintiff point out
how this instruction could or did mislead the jury from a
proper determination of the two issues involved, or how
or in what manner it was prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the plaintiff, preventing him from having a fair
trial. The court was again telling the jury here, that apart
from the claims of plaintiff concerning the official inves-
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tigation, they had to decide the issue on the evidence before
them at the trial.
The plaintiff complains principally of Instruction No.
5, which reads as follows:
"You are instructed that the defendant had a
right to dismiss any employee, including the plaintiff W. B. Russell, for violation of Rule 55 (b) of
the contract which is in evidence, so long as the
defendant was not acting in bad faith and arbitrarily
and so long as the employee was physically able to
comply with the provisions of said Rule 55 (b). And
if you find that the plaintiff did violate said Rule
55 (b) being physically able to comply therewith,
and that the defendant was not acting in bad faith
and arbitrarily when it dismissed him for such violation, your verdict should be in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff 'no cause of action.' "
His complaint is that it places the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff "to prove bad faith on the part of the defendant and in addition to a physical impossibility on his part
to perform." But he does not point out wherein or how this
instruction places the burden on the plaintiff as claimed.
The court clearly told the jury in its Instruction No. 2 that
the burden 1vas upon the railroad to prove "Mr. Russell was
in fact guilty of violation of Rule 55 (b) by being absent
from July 20 to July 31 without proper leave under circumstances justifying his dismissal." The jury was therefore
instructed that not only was the burden upon the defendant to prove violation of Rule 55 (b) by a preponderance
of the evidence, but that the defendant had the burden of
negativing plaintiff's claim that it was physically impossible for him to comply with the rule. The instructions also
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placed on the defendant the burden of proving that it did
not act arbitrarily or in bad faith which we think is established if the evidence satisfies the jury that the plaintiff
was not so incapacitated as to be unable to comply with the
rule. We think the instruction is strictly in line with the
former decision of this court and was. most favorable· to
the plaintiff, giving him every advantage he was entitled
to. This instruction was a correct, albeit an abstract statement of the· law. It did not purport to deal with the burden
of proof and of course must be read in the light of all the
instructions. This court has many times said that the court
cannot and need not cover the entire case in one instruction. The court told the jury in Instruction No. 15 that the
instructions were "to be considered and construed as one
connected \Vhole," and that the instructions were to be
considered as a whole. The instructions as a whole clearly
placed the burden of proving all elements set forth in Instruction No. 5 squarely on defendant.
Plaintiff's counsel next discusses errors in the instructions given by the court on damages and, since a verdict
was returned in favor of the defendant, instructions on
dan1ages, right or wrong, are moot, and we do not feel
called upon to discuss them. The foregoing constitutes all
of the exceptions taken to the instructions given by the
court.

Plaintiff's exceptions to the court's refusal to· grant
requested instructio1tS: The plaintiff complains of the
court's refusal to grant his requested Instruction Nos. 1
to 12, inclusive, his exceptions mainly being that his requests Hcorrectly set forth the la,v."
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His Request No. 1 is palpably in error because it says
in effect that the jury was required to find from the transcript of the unsworn testimony at the investigation (all
hearsay evidence) that the plaintiff's guilt was established,
a question the jury, according to the former opinion of this
court and the theory on which the case was tried, was required to determine from all the evidence produced before

it at the trial.
Plaintiff's Requests Nos. 2, 8 and 9 are concerned with
damages and call for no comment.
Plaintiff's Request No. 3 is subject to the same vice
as· Request No. 1, as it tells the jury they must find that
the defendant's guilt was proved at the hearing.
Plaintiff's Request No. 4 clearly assumes that Russell
was ill during the period of time which was the subject of
the investigation and this was one of the two principal
and disputed issues in the case. If it had not been, the
plaintiff would have been entitled to a directed verdict, and
it cannot be said that there was not a great deal of conflicting evidence thereon.
Plaintiff's Request No. 6 tells the jury that Mr. McDaniels had no authority to bind Russell in his negotiations
with Paulsen, which is palpably erroneous, and it goes so
far as to instruct the jury to ignore the entire transaction
and negotiations between Mr. Paulsen for the company
and Mr. McDaniels, the personal representative of the plaintiff. It is actually a request for a directed verdict on this
important issue.
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 7 tells the jury that there
can be no violation of the contract unless the evidence shows
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that Russell intentionally and wilfully violated the contract.
The plaintiff had no right to such an instruction under the
contract of employment or otherwise. Nonetheless the burden placed upon the defendant in the instructions required
the defendant to prove that the defendant's absence was
not due to the claimed cause, to wit, sickness, that k~pt him
"right down in bed ;" and therefore this instruction was
given in effect.
Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 10, while correct
in the last sentence, is otherwise in error and seriously so.
It tells the jury that the plaintiff does not need to prove
his performance under the contract. The former decision
of this court specifically holds that he must "prove his performance (under the contract) up to the time of discharge"
and we are quoting.
Plaintiff's Request No. 11 again tells the jury that
McDaniels as a matter of law, did not have authority to
dispose of Russell's case with Mr. Paulsen, and is palpably
erroneous.
Plaintiff's Request No. 12 is substantially correct, and
it was given in substance. It is nothing but a stock instruction. The requested n1atter was adequately covered.
In the instructions that the court did give to the jury
the law 'vas fully and accurately stated as it applied to
the two issues involved in the case. Simply stated, these
two issues were (1) was the defendant justified in discharging the plaintiff and ( 2) did the parties settle and
dispose of the controversy by mutual agreement.
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Even though there was error in the instructions given
on that issue which dealt with the validity of the discharge,
it does not control the disposition of this case. For the
plaintiff assigns no error whatever in the court's instructions in submitting to the jury the issue as to whether the
grievance had been settled and disposed of by mutual agreement long before suit, nor does plaintiff claim the evidence
on this issue was insufficient to support the verdict.
We submit, on this issue alone, to which we now turn,
the unanimous verdict of "no cause of action" disposes of
the case and warrants affirmance of the judgment.

POINT V.
THIS CASE WAS SETTLED AND DISPOSED
OF BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
The plaintiff has nothing whatsoever to say concerning this issue in his brief, but because we think that standing by itself it is sufficient to warrant the verdict of "no
cause of action" and to indicate to this court the proper
disposition of this case, we feel it should be discussed separately. 'i'Te call the court's attention to the fact that all
of the assignments of error in plaintiff's brief relate to
the other issue in the case which involved the "validity of
the discharge." No error at all is claimed in connection with
the above issue either as to instructions given or the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict thereon. The
only error assigned in the brief is that the court was in
error in not granting all of plaintiff's instructions num-
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bered 1 through 12. I assume this covers plaintiff's Request No. 11, but plaintiff says nothing about it in his brief,
except to point out that Instruction No. 11 told the jury
that the burden of proof was upon the defendant (page 30 of
plaintiff's brief. He argues that this is correct and we agree.
The jury was so instructed. The plaintiff did take an exception to the court's Instruction No. 6, which sets forth both
the theory of the plaintiff and that of the defendant on the
issue now under discussion and concluded by telling the jury
that the burden was on the defendant to prove that the case
had been settled and disposed of by mutual agreement between the parties (R. 24). No claim whatever is made in the
brief that the court erred in this instruction and the reasons
given for the exception taken at the trial are not mentioned
or discussed by plaintiff except for plaintiff's exception to
the court's refusal to grant his Request No. 11 (the error of
which he does not discuss at all in the brief) . There is no
error claimed by the defendant with relation to the issue
now under discussion as t<?· instructions given by the court,
instructions requested and refused and no complaint is
made that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury.
This was, of course, a proper issue to be submitted;
as the National Railway Labor Act requires in contracts
such as here involved, that "disputes between an employee
or group of employees and a carrier, or carriers, growing
out of grievances * * * shall be handled in the usual
manner up to and including the chief operating officer of
the carrier designated to handle such disputes." 45 USC
S.ec. 153 (i). The same section of the Act then provides

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

that if the grievance is then not settled by mutual agreement that either party may submit it to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The employee, of course, may sue in the
courts as well, if an only if, agreement is not reached by
negotiation on the property. Slocum vs. Delaware Lackawana Western Ry., 339 US 239, 94 L. Ed. 795, 61 Sp. Ct.
577. Paulsen was the chief operating officer and the case
was settled by mutual agreement, as contemplated by the
Railway Labor Act. The parties were following the procedure provided in the Railway Labor Act for settlement of
the grievance, and by mutual agreement reached a settlement thereof. The Railway Labor Act, designed to keep
litigation concerning railroad labor matters from flooding
the courts should be maintained by the courts.
After Russell's application for reinstatement had been
rejected by Superintendent Edens, he had the unquestioned
right under the contract to appeal to the highest supervising officer of the company, Mr. F. C. Paulsen, who was the
Vice President and Chief Operating and Executive Officer
of the defendant company (Tr. 152). This final appeal he
took, being represented by Mr. C. E. McDaniels, acting
Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North America.
He authorized McDaniels in writing as an officer of the
SUNA, to prosecute and progress his grievance claim, to
act as his agent and representative in his "place and stead"
and authorized McDaniels to "negotiate, adjust and dispose
of" the grievance "in any manner" ( Def. Ex. I). McDaniels proceeded to handle Russell's claim and after some correspondence a conference was arranged in the office of Mr.
Paulsen in Salt Lake City between Mr. Paulsen and Mr.
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McDaniels. This conference took place May 7, 1946, Mr.
McDaniels and Mr. Paulsen being the only ones present
(Tr. 159). There was but the one conference (Tr. 159).
Mr. Paulsen and Mr. McDaniels reviewed the investigation
(Tr. 160) and Mr. Paulsen told McDaniels that Russell
had falsified at the investigation (Tr. 161). Mr. McDaniels told Paulsen that if Russell falsified at the investigation "we don't condone it" (Tr. 161). McDaniels asked for
an opportunity to investigate the charge Mr. Paulsen had
made, stating that if the accusation was correct he would
advise Paulsen thereof, but that he wanted "to be sure that
I'm right" and "I'll not go along with a man that will not
tell the truth" (Tr. 160-161-162). The conference closed
on this note. No further conferences were held and Mr.
Paulsen heard no more from either McDaniels, or Russell
or anyone else on Russell's behalf, (Tr. 162) except through
a letter dated lV[ay 14, 1946, written by Mr. McDaniels
( Def. Ex. 13) and addressed to Mr. Paulsen.
McDaniels in this letter referred to the conference held
with Mr. Paulsen on May 7 and specifically to the charge
that Russell had falsified and then said:
"As agreed during our conference, further action on the subject matter was to be held in abeyance
pending our investigation of undesirable procedure
on the part of Mr. Russell resulting in false testimony evidenced during formal investigation of
August 3, 1945.
"This investigation has been completed and it
is without prejudice to our contentions and position
as expressed in our letter of February 15, 1946 and
without establishing a precedent as to adjustment
of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and
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circumstances devolving upon similar allegations as
appear in the introduction of the formal investigation of August 3, 1945, we are withdrawing the
griev,ance and the case is closed."
Upon receipt of the foregoing letter from Mr. McDaniels, Mr. P'aulsen closed his files on the case and thereafter
treated the matter as he testified, as a dead issue and heard
no more thereon until Russell filed this suit for unlawful
discharge in May of 1949, three years later (Tr. 165). Mr.
McDaniels testified that under defendant's Exhibit I, which
was the authorization admittedly executed by Russell, he
had authority to dispose of the grievance in any manner
(Tr. 201-202). His written authority (Def. Ex. I) speaks
for itself, but this testimony shows that McDaniels knew
when he advised Paulsen that the grievance was withdrawn
and the case closed that he was terminating the controversy
with finality. It was claimed by plaintiff that the language
in McDaniel's letter, viz.: "it is without prejudice to our
contentions and position as expressed in our letter of F'ebruary 15, 1946 and without establishing a precedent as to
adjustment of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts
and circumstances devolving upon similar allegations" was
a statement to Mr. Paulsen that he, McDaniels, was withdrawing as Mr. Russell's representative leaving Mr. Russell
to negotiate further with Mr. Paulsen, and to prosecute his
grievance and claim against the company in any way he
saw fit. Perhaps this language may be considered to inject
some ambiguity into the letter. In the former opinion, referring to this letter, Mr. Justice McDonough said :
I

"The letter heretofore referred to from the Vice
President of the union to the Vice President of de-
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fendant indicates that conferences were had between
the representatives of the er.aployer and employee,
after which the representative of the latter apparently indicated that his investigation showed that
the plaintiff had given false testimony at the hearing before the Assistant Superintendent."
Further Justice McDonuogh said:
"It would be a travesty of justice to permit the
plaintiff to recover in this proceeding substantial
damages based upon an unsworn statement of the
interested plaintiff which his duly authorized representative evidently concluded was false."
The italics in the foregoing quotations are ours, made to
indicate that the court thought (and certainly with some
justification) that McDaniel's letter closing the case was
not wholly unequivocable. To remove all doubt on this score,
we brought Mr. F. C. Paulsen, from Los Angeles to testify
with respect to the conference between him and Mr. McDaniels, which precipitated the letter in question. \Ve thought
if we could show vvhat transpired at that conference it
would remove all ambiguity and any question of the meaning of Mr. McDaniel's letter. We think we accomplished
our purpose. The testimony of lVlr. Paulsen quoted above
shows that after he told McDaniels at the conference that
Russell had falsified at the investigation McDaniels said
"v.re don't condone it," asked for an opportunity to investigate the charge stating he '\Vould advise lVfr. Paulsen if he
found the accusation was correct and as IVIr. Paulsen testified McDaniels said he ,,~anted "to be sure that I'm right"
and "I'll not go along with a man that '\vill not tell the
truth."
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The defendant called Mr. McDaniels to testify at the
trial. Mr. McDaniels' testim~~o the effect that
Paulsen told him Russell ha~~
at the formal investigation ( Tr. 109) . Mr. McDaniels claimed that he withdrew on instructions from the Grand Lodge of the Switchmen's Union of North An1erica (Tr. 194) because Russell
was delinquent in his dues. He did not produce this letter,
but testified it and all other correspondence that he had
with the Grand Lodge of the Switchmen's Union of North
America concerning this case had been destroyed ( Tr. 197) .
When asked the following question by Mr. Bronson:
\Vhy do you destroy official communications of that kind concerning the business of the
SUNA?"
"Q.

He answered :
"Because such letters of that description, Mr.
Counselor, establishes policy procedure on the part
of the organization, and by reason of a certain degree of intimacy between the operating railroad
organizations we are not permitted to keep those
letters on file whatsoever. They could possibly be
confiscated and used as propaganda.
In other words you destroy all your correspondence in your organization?
"A. Where they establish policy.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

That is what happened to this letter?
Exactly" ( Tr. 198) .

With respect to the portion of the letter which plaintiff contends was a statement by McDaniels that he was
'vithdrawing the grievance without prejudice to Russell, it
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is clear that this is an after-thought and a desperate attempt to avoid the true meaning and effect of the letter.
McDaniels testified that the language "without prejudice
etc." was more or less formal language commonly used in
communications making final disposition of labor claims
(Tr. 211). He was asked:
"Q. And didn't it mean this Mr. McDaniels,
that you say to management when you are disposing
of a case one way or another, you say that to them,
so that you put them on notice; that if in the future
a case of another man comes up where the facts are
different, different situation, that they won't point
to this case and say 'you did thus and so; and therefore this thing is your precedent'?
"A. That's right. Part of the purpose; yes
sir."
While he was on the stand in the trial below, his attention was called to a deposition he had given before trial
and after the proper preliminaries (Tr. 212-213), he was
asked if he did not make the following statements :
"Q.

I asked you this question:

" 'Question. Now, as a matter of fact, this
expression you used in your letter "without
prejudice to any position you wanted to take in
connection with the handling of future grievances" is almost a formal expression which is
used by you and other men handling grievances
with railroad carriers so that if a case arises
in the future the company won't refer to this
case you have handled and call it a precedent
and use it against you to your prejudice. Isn't
that the reason?'
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"Q.

And your Answer :
" 'Answer : That's correct.' "

To which Mr. McDaniels answered at the trial:
"A. It remains unaltered, if that is the question" (Tr. 213).
And, futher, (referring to the deposition) :
" 'Question: Well, isn't that what you had in
mind ; that you wanted to say and did say there that
regardless of your handling of this case and the decision that you made and that Paulsen made in the
disposition of the case that you didn't want it to be
considered as setting a precedent as to adjustment
of future grievances possessing dissimilar facts and
circumstances.'
"Q. And your Answer:
"'Answer: That's correct.'
"Q.

"A.

Did you so answer?
Yes, sir" (Tr. 215).

It cannot be said that McDaniels was a completely disinterested witness. Plaintiff's attorney, Mr. Patterson, is
the regional counsel for Mr. McDaniels' organization, the
Switchmen's Union of North America (Tr. 215).
We think that having now proved what transpired at
the conference, which later precipitated this critical letter
of Mr. McDaniels, together with the evidence bearing on the
meaning of that portion of the letter, which states in effect
that McDaniels does not want his action to be used as a
precedent to prejudice him in the handling of future grievances where the facts are different, that we have removed
all ambiguity as to the true meaning of the letter. It was
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not the defendant railroad but the plaintiff, through McDaniels, who withdrew the grievance and closed the case.
rrhe railroad of course assented. McDaniels' authority to
thus handle and conclude the matter is undisputed and it
was never revoked.
We think that if there was nothing more in the case;
that this issue, would be entirely sufficient to warrant affirmance of the j udgm.ent. If we concede error in the court's
instructions and in its refusal to grant plaintiff's requested
instructions, as well as insufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's findings that Russell violated Rule 55(b)
and was not denied his rights under Rule 38; we nonetheless submit that the judgment should be affirmed on this
other issue in the case. One count sustained by sufficient

evidence and free from error is all that is required to support a verdict. With respect to the issue as to whether or
not the case was "settled by mutual agreement" it is our
position that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict in defendant's favor and that there was no error in
connection with the instructions or otherwise in submitting
this issue to the jury. No error is assigned relative to the
court's instruction other than plaintiff's exception to the
court's refusal to grant his Request No. 11, which was in
effect a request to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff
on this issue an issue on which there was much conflicting
evidence.
In Berger vs. Southern Pacific Company, The Pullman Company and J. V. Z eno, ( . . . Cal. App. . .. ) 300 P.
(2d) 170, decided, Sept. 1956, the plaintiff sought damages
on account of an alleged assault by a pullman porter. The
case was dismissed as against the Southern Pacific Com-
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pany and proceeded against The Pullman Company and the
individual defendant on two counts, one based on negligence,
the other on assault. Both issues were submitted to the
jury, who returned a general verdict against both defendants. It was thus impossible to determine whether the
general verdict was based on the first or second counts or
issues, or both. The Appellate Court held that there was
no evidence whatever to support a verdict based on the
first count. Nonetheless it held that "the erroneous submission to the jury of the first count and the giving of
instructions therein is not prejudicial if the second count
can be sustained."
The court cited with approval the language in the case
of Leoni vs. Delany, 83 Cal. App. (2d) 303, 188 P. (2d)
765, which had this to say in considering the question we
now urge on the court:
"If one count is not affected by error and there
is substantial evidence to support a verdict with
respect to it, it is immaterial that there may have
been errors committed in connection with another
count or that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict as to such other count. One count
sustained by sufficient evidence and free from error
is all that is required to support a verdict. The
specifications of error which the appellant has made
with reference to giving and the refusal to give certain instructions, all pertain to the first cause of
action and are immaterial to the second count."
There being no error and the evidence being sufficient
to warrant the general verdict in favor of the defendant on
this issue, we submit that this court can affirm on that
ground alone.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH,
Counsel for Defendant
and Respondent.
10 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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